Re: Developments in crisis management: implications for the Netherlands

Dear Mr Korthals Altes,

Introduction
Negative experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina prompted a reconsideration of peace operations in the mid-1990s. In its report ‘Lost Innocence’ of March 1996, the Advisory Council on Peace and Security (AVV) drew lessons from these experiences in a series of recommendations. Since then, there have been further developments in peace operations – not only in the way they are conducted, but also in the institutional and procedural frameworks within which national and international decision-making takes place. Against this background, the government requests the AIV for an advisory report on the implications of these developments for the Netherlands, with particular emphasis on the following elements.

Most of today’s armed conflicts are highly complex and take place within states. Furthermore, they are often associated with humanitarian emergencies. This makes it both more difficult and more urgent for the international community to intervene. Intervention in such conflicts requires an international force with enough authority and resources to keep the situation under control, even when the security situation deteriorates. Such a force therefore needs an adequate mandate. It must also be equipped and prepared to fight, if necessary, irrespective of whether it uses force on behalf of one of the parties and or whether it has the permission of the parties to the conflict.

For some time there has been an unmistakable trend towards more ‘robust’ mandates based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, rather than Chapter VI. This gives troops more authority to use force in completing their mission. At the same time, however, a mandate must always be feasible. It must be clear what the troops are expected to do and, preferably, what they are not expected to do. The latter applies particularly in the case of such large-scale, wide-ranging tasks as protecting the civilian population or separating the warring parties. Finally, the scale and composition of the intervention force must of course be tailored to the task in hand and the security situation in which it will be required to operate.

A report issued in 2000 by a UN panel under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) stated that, while the UN now had considerable experience of traditional peace operations, it was not well equipped to carry out ‘heavier’ operations in a complex setting. The UN therefore often leaves such operations to a regional organisation such as NATO, ECOWAS or the EU. Another trend has seen the UN mandating an ad hoc coalition of countries that are willing and able to carry out a military intervention. Command over such a UN-mandated coalition is generally in the hands of a lead nation. The United Kingdom, Turkey and the Netherlands/Germany have all taken command of ISAF, for example. Although this trend looks likely to continue, few countries are willing and able to lead a long-term operation. As has been seen with ISAF, however, after a time there is a need for more continuity of leadership. This can be provided by structural involvement on the part of an organisation such as NATO, the EU or the UN. NATO supported ISAF for a time, and is now in fact leading the operation. It is also to support the Polish division participating in the stabilisation force in Iraq. This marks the de facto start of NATO out-of-area deployment.

In recent years, successive peace enforcement operations have followed on from armed intervention or armed conflict. Consider, for example, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, where a stabilisation phase set in after deployment of heavy military resources. This meant that international forces already on the ground had to fulfil a different role. An initial entry military stabilisation force in the crisis area can thus find itself in a situation where there is no adequate administrative or power structure.

In view of the above, we should like to put the following questions to the Council.

1. The Dutch armed forces
The implementation of crisis management operations, including those involving a high degree of force, is one of the main tasks of the armed forces. Since the early 1990s the Netherlands has taken part in no fewer than nine major operations, supplying considerable numbers of troops. In the future, the Netherlands’ level of participation in crisis management operations will be determined not only by the aim of each operation, but also by the way in which the Dutch armed forces are able to fulfil the new requirements of such operations. This last consideration also played a major role in the decisions on where the Ministry of Defence is to step up or cut back its activities over the next ten years, a letter on which was received by the House of Representatives on 16 September. The question is: What will be the implications of ‘heavier’ crisis management operations for the Dutch armed forces? In particular: should the organisation of the armed forces focus on its initial entry capability, alongside its capacity to contribution to a follow-on force, including its stabilisation function?

2. National decision-making
In crisis management operations, the Netherlands always acts as part of an international force. Before making military units available for the promotion and enforcement of the international legal order, the government informs the States General, in accordance with Article 100 of the Constitution. The national decision-making procedure on the deployment of troops to which Article 100 applies is set out in the 2001 Frame of Reference for decisionmaking for the deployment of military units abroad. In this connection, the recommendations of the ad-hoc committee set up to consider decision-making on troop deployment (2000) – which have largely been adopted by the government – are also important.

In recent years, various initiatives have been undertaken to set up multinational military units, such as the planned NATO Response Force and its European counterpart. The Dutch armed forces also engage in bilateral cooperation with a number of countries. In its recent advisory report on military cooperation in Europe, the AIV argues that nation states will have to relinquish some of their decision-making power if such operations are to be successful. It is not clear how the further embedding of Dutch units in multinational military alliances will impact on national decision-making procedures. The question is therefore: Would it be appropriate to amend the Frame of Reference for the deployment of units, or can the procedures be changed in such a way that the need for rapid expeditionary collective intervention can be met, while still guaranteeing the involvement of parliament?

3. Integrated policy on security and development
In post-conflict countries and countries that are at risk of destabilisation and violent conflict security, stability and development are closely linked. It is not clear whether current efforts by the international community – including the Netherlands – take a sufficiently integrated approach to these issues. Such countries need security and stability in order to develop. Effective management and resolution of crises are also essential. After all, it is the poor who suffer most from insecurity, human rights abuses and the social and economic impact of destabilisation. Like health care and education, security is a public good, which also has a bearing on development.

Consequently, activities in these countries designed to enhance their capacity to maintain peace and security in the long term are part of the process of state formation. As in other areas (justice, police, finance etc.), state formation in the security sector is essential for development. Activities designed to guarantee security, which include support for the creation of a security apparatus under civilian control encompassing both the armed forces and the police, are equally relevant to development. The current OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) rule out support for military components of the security sector, however. Experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Great Lakes region of Africa have raised doubts as to whether this is appropriate. How, for example, would the transformation of a group of 250,000 fighters led by warlords in Afghanistan into an armed force of 70,000 under civilian control to form a defence apparatus (which is currently non-ODA) be less relevant to development than the creation of an Afghan police apparatus (which is currently eligible for ODA)?

The ODA criteria do however permit a limited number of crisis management activities performed by troops as part of peace operations. The net additional costs incurred for the following activities are ODA-eligible: support for human rights, election monitoring, reintegration of demobilised soldiers, decommissioning of their weapons, repair of basic infrastructure, supervision and training of civil servants and police officers, customs, border controls, macroeconomic policy advice, and humanitarian mine clearance operations. In the past, these activities have been performed largely by UN troops (‘blue helmets’). The criteria allow for ‘similar’ activities to be included in ODA outside the UN framework, although only election monitoring, human rights activities, mine clearance and demobilisation are actually specified. Other activities are not always reported to the OECD-DAC as ODA if they are not carried out by blue helmets.

In the view of the government, it is undesirable for such lack of clarity to persist regarding interpretation of the OECD-DAC criteria for ODA. This lack of clarity, which also exists at international level, has led to a persistent division between peace and security policy on the one hand and development policy on the other.

This prompts the final set of questions: How does the AIV regard this issue and the need for a change in policy? How can Dutch and international integrated security policy be given further substance, and placed firmly on the agenda? What opportunities does the AIV believe the stability fund will offer in this regard? How does the AIV view the role of the ODA definition in the formation of integrated policy? Does the AIV believe the ODA criteria should be amended? In other words: Does the division between ODA and non-ODA limit the options for effective national and international action for peace, security and development? As regards the role of the armed forces: what military activities does the AIV regard as relevant to development and should the ODA criteria be amended to reflect this? This mainly concerns efforts to strengthen local security structures and the role of the international community and of Dutch troops. Could the Dutch armed forces play a greater role in providing technical assistance for the reconstruction of a country, for example, in the framework of integrated security policy, particularly in the security sector, and in weapons decommissioning, demobilisation and reintegration programmes?

Mr F. Korthals Altes
Chairman of the Advisory Council
on International Affairs
Postbus 20061
2500 EB Den Haag
 

The Hague
19 February 2004

Dear Mr Korthals Altes,
 

On 29 October 2003, the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Development Cooperation and I submitted three questions for your consideration relating to developments in crisis management and their implications for the Netherlands.

One of the subjects of the letter was that possible embedding of Dutch units in multinational forces might have consequences for the national decision-making procedure for deploying Dutch military units to maintain and promote the international legal order. This is why we put the following question to you: Would it be appropriate to amend the Frame of Reference for the deployment of units, or can the procedures be changed in such a way that the need for rapid expeditionary collective intervention can be met, while still guaranteeing the involvement of parliament?

On 4 February 2004, the Senate debated the bills for adopting the 2004 budget statement of both the Ministry of Defence (Chapter X of the national budget) (2900200-X) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chapter V of the national budget) (29200-V, NATO section). During the debate, the question arose of possible overlap of the objectives for deployment of Dutch military units both "for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom" and "to maintain and promote the international legal order" (Article 97(1) of the Constitution). Some speakers asserted that overlap would have consequences for the involvement of parliament, in particular, as regards the obligation to inform [it] in advance in accordance with Article 100 of the Constitution.

The Minister of Defence and I would request that you also deal with this point – possible overlap of objectives and its consequences for the involvement of parliament in the decision- making process – in your advisory report on the previous question regarding the national decision-making procedure for deployment of Dutch military units to maintain and promote the international legal order.
 

Yours sincerely,
 

Bernard Bot
Minister of Foreign Affairs